Nonconscious Pain, Suffering, and Moral Status

AbstractPain is an unwanted mental state that is often considered a sufficient ground for moral status. However, current science and philosophy of mind suggest that pains, like other perceptual states, might be nonconscious. This raises the questions of whether the notion of nonconscious pain is coherent and what its moral significance might be. In this paper I argue that the existence of nonconscious pain is conceptually coherent; however as a matter of fact our brains might always represent pains consciously. I then characterize the concept of suffering from a naturalistic perspective, distinguishing it from pain. I offer an account of suffering based on some current theories of consciousness, in which suffering consists in the global broadcasting of representations with overall net negative valence. I argue this can explain most of suffering ’s properties, such as its wholeness, significance for welfare, and conscious character. Finally, I contend that suffering, but not pain, provides sufficient grounds for moral status.

Source: Neuroethics - February 4, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research