On the adoption of nonpharmaceutical interventions during the pandemic: An evolutionary game model

This article fills the research gap by developing an evolutionary game-theoretic framework to model the dynamics of population behavior on the adoption of NPI. We construct the two-group asymmetric game, where behavioral change for each group is characterized by replicator equations. Sensitivity analyses are performed to examine the long-term stability of equilibrium points with respect to perturbation of model parameters. We found that the limiting behavior of intervention adoption in the population consists of only pure strategies in a game setting, indicating that the evolutionary outcome is that everyone either takes up the preventive measure or not. We also applied the framework to examine the mask-wearing behavior, and validated with actual data. Overall, this article provides insights into population dynamics on the adoption of intervention strategy during the outbreak, which can be beneficial for policy makers to better understand the evolutionary trajectory of population  behavior.
Source: Risk Analysis - Category: International Medicine & Public Health Authors: Tags: ORIGINAL ARTICLE Source Type: research