Terminalism and how dying patients are conditioned as docile bodies

Philip Reed (2023) argues that discrimination against (non-acutely) dying patients constitutes a unique kind—which he calls terminalism—because their status as persons with terminal illness marks them with a socially salient identity which, by means of direct and indirect discrimination, limits their sets of choices and resources, such as in hospice care or organ transplant policies.1 Importantly, Reed also argues that while terminalism is an increasingly prevalent normative phenomenon, it has been overlooked in the literature, ‘hiding in plain sight’ as even though we are ‘aware of it at some level’."1 What could explain this paradox? Drawing from Jeffrey Bishop, Giorgio Agamben, and T. Kenny Fountain, I argue that an institutional episteme and operating assumption of medicine, from the training of medical students, discursively disciplines terminally ill persons as bare life, between medicine’s dichotomy of bodies: neither ‘biovaluable’ (the surplus value of separated human bodily material...
Source: Journal of Medical Ethics - Category: Medical Ethics Authors: Tags: Commentary Source Type: research