Assessing and mitigating privacy risks of sparse, noisy genotypes by local alignment to haplotype databases [METHOD]

We present a computational tool suite, termed Privacy Leakage by Inference across Genotypic HMM Trajectories (PLIGHT), using population-genetics-based hidden Markov models (HMMs) of recombination and mutation to find piecewise alignment of small, noisy SNP sets to reference haplotype databases. We explore cases in which query individuals are either known to be in the database, or not, and consider several genotype queries, including those from environmental sample swabs from known individuals and from simulated "mosaics" (two-individual composites). Using PLIGHT on a database with ~5000 haplotypes, we find for common, noise-free SNPs that only ten are sufficient to identify individuals, ~20 can identify both components in two-individual mosaics, and 20–30 can identify first-order relatives. Using noisy environmental-sample-derived SNPs, PLIGHT identifies individuals in a database using ~30 SNPs. Even when the individuals are not in the database, local genotype matches allow for some phenotypic information leakage based on coarse-grained SNP imputation. Finally, by quantifying privacy leakage from sparse SNP sets, PLIGHT helps determine the value of selectively sanitizing released SNPs without explicit assumptions about population membership or allele frequency. To make this practical, we provide a sanitization tool to remove the most identifying SNPs from genomic data.
Source: Genome Research - Category: Genetics & Stem Cells Authors: Tags: METHOD Source Type: research