What You ’re Rejecting When You’re Expecting

AbstractI defend twocollapsing orreductionist arguments against weak pro-natalism (WPN), the view that procreation is generally merely permissible. In particular, I argue that WPN collapses into strong pro-natalism (SPN), the view that procreation is generally obligatory. Because SPN conflicts with the dominant view that procreation is never obligatory, demonstrating that WPN collapses into or entails SPN establishes epistemic parity (at least as concerns reproductive liberty) between WPN and anti-natalism (AN), the view that procreation is always impermissible. First, I distinguish between two moral goods: the good of procreation itself and the good of procreative potential. Second, I contend that the average moral agent is obligated to assist needy children via adoption, fostering, or other financial or interpersonal support. Third, I present the first collapsing argument: if an agent ’s justification for not assisting needy children is preservation of their resources (financial or interpersonal) for theiractual future offspring, that justification is preservedonly if they eventually and actually procreate. Thus, their eventual procreation is morally obligatory and SPN follows. Fourth, I present the second collapsing argument, which assumes procreative potential as the relevant good: if an agent ’s justification for not assisting needy children is preservation of their resources for theirpotential future offspring, that justification holds only if (a) the objective or s...
Source: Journal of Bioethical Inquiry - Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research