Moral Responsibility for Racial Oppression

AbstractIn his recent monograph, (Re-)defining Racism: A Philosophical Analysis (2020), Alberto G. Urquidez invites the reader to take a fresh look at the confused and complicated concept of racism. Drawing on Wittgenstein ’s philosophy of language, Urquidez argues that debates over racism are not about discovering what racism really refers to in the world but the appropriate rule of representation— the standard of the correct use of the term (p. 25–26). Discovering racism is a normative endeavor and, he argues, a prescriptive one (Urquidez, p. 26). My comments here are not intended as a critique of Urquidez’ account so much as an opportunity to reflect on where he might go from here in developing his account. In particular, I focus on lingering questions over the relationship between the critique of str uctures and practices licensed by political morality and that of individual behaviors. I explore how Urquidez grounds claims of individual moral responsibility for racism.
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research