Some Probably-Not-Very-Good Thoughts on Underconfidence
(Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - May 29, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Blaming the Intellectually Vicious: a Critical Discussion of Cassam ’s Account of Blameworthiness and Reprehensibility for Epistemic Vice
AbstractThere is much of interest in Cassam ’s ground-breakingVices of the Mind (2019). This discussion focuses exclusively on one aspect of his view, namely, his account of what it takes to be properly criticisable or blameworthy for one ’s epistemic vices. This critical discussion consists of two sections. The first provides an overview of Cassam’s account of responsibility and criticisability for intellectual vices. The second raises a problem for that account whose formulation is due to Battaly (2019) and proposes a solution which, at least in part, could also be adopted by Cassam himself if he were p...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - May 28, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Sanctuary Cities and Non-Refoulement
AbstractMore than two hundred cities in the United States have now declared themselves to be sanctuary cities. This declaration involves a commitment to non-compliance with federal law; the sanctuary city will refuse to use its own juridical power – including, more crucially, its own police powers – to assist the federal government in the deportation of undocumented residents. We will argue that the sanctuary city might be morally defensible, even if deportation is not always wrong, and even if the federal government is legally permitted to demand that states participate in the process of deportation. We defend...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - May 22, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Katherine Hawley: How to be Trustworthy
(Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - May 18, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Jan-Christoph Heilinger: Cosmopolitan Responsibility - Global Injustice, Relational Equality, and Individual Agency
(Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - May 16, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

“Perspectives on and Standards of Life’s Meaningfulness: A Reply to Landau”
AbstractIn a recent article Iddo Landau has defended his distinction between perspectives on and standards of meaning in life to support his rebuttal of a familiar pessimistic objection to the meaningfulness of human life. According to that complaint, human life is meaningless when viewed from a detached, cosmic, orsub specie aeternitatis [SSA] perspective. Landau argues that a cosmic perspective need not entail a comparably high standard of meaningfulness. What counts on his view then is not the perspective, which is compatible with any number of possible standards for what constitutes an adequate amount of meaningfulness...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - May 11, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

The Likelihood of Actions and the Neurobiology of Virtues: Veto and Consent Power
AbstractAn increasing number of studies indicate that virtues affect brain structure. These studies might shed new light on some neuroethical perspectives suggesting that our brain network activity determines the acquisition and permanence of virtues. According to these perspectives, virtuous behavior could be interpreted as the product of a brain mechanism supervised by genes and environment and not as the result of free choice. In this respect, the neural correlates of virtues would confirm the deterministic theory. In contrast, I maintain that these findings do not undermine the role of willpower and freedom while reinf...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - May 9, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Love, Reasons, and Desire
AbstractThis essay defends subjectivism about reasons of love. These are the normative reasons we have to treat those we love especially well, such as the reasons we have to treat our close friends or life partners better than strangers. Subjectivism about reasons of love is the view that every reason of love a person has is correctly explained by her desires. I formulate a version of subjectivism about reasons of love and defend it against three objections that have been made to this kind of view. Firstly, it has been argued that the phenomenology of our focus when we have reasons of love does not fit with subjectivism ab...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - May 8, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

No need to get up from the armchair (if you ’re interested in debunking arguments in metaethics)
AbstractSeveral authors believe that metaethicists ought to leave their comfortable armchairs and engage with serious empirical research. This paper provides partial support for the opposing view, that metaethics is rightly conducted from the armchair. It does so by focusing on debunking arguments against robust moral realism. Specifically, the article discusses arguments based on the possibility that if robust realism is correct, then our beliefs are most likely insensitive to the relevant truths. These arguments seem at first glance to be dependent on empirical research to learn what our moral beliefs are sensitive to. I...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - May 7, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Connie M. Ulrich & amp; Christine Grady, Moral Distress in the Health Professions
(Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - May 6, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Sven Nyholm: Humans and Robots: Ethics, Agency, and Anthropomorphism
(Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - April 20, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Genetic Selective Abortion: Still a Matter of Choice
AbstractJeremy Williams has argued that if we are committed to a liberal pro-choice stance with regard to selective abortion for disability, we will be unable to justify the prohibition of sex selective abortion. Here, I apply his reasoning to selective abortion based on other traits pregnant women may decide are undesirable. These include susceptibility to disease, level of intelligence, physical appearance, sexual orientation, religious belief and criminality —in fact any traits attributable to some degree to a genetic component. Firstly, I review Williams’ argument, which claims that if a woman is granted th...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - April 8, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Rethinking the Foundations of Just War Theory
AbstractKai Draper ’sWar and Individual Rights: The Foundations of Just War Theory (2016) seeks to “give birth to an alternative approach” to traditional just war theory (pp. 2–3). This review seeks to analyse and evaluate this alternative approach. Draper’s approach to just war theory differs from other approaches in three ways. First, it is “highly individualistic.” Second, Draper’ s approach avoids reliance upon the principle of double effect. Third, this approach is “largely rights-based”—it seeks “to understand the ethics of war mostly by way of u...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - March 29, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Stefano Bartolini: The Political
(Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - March 23, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Learning from Failure: Shame and Emotion Regulation in Virtue as Skill
AbstractOn an account of virtue as skill, virtues are acquired in the ways that skills are acquired. In this paper I focus on one implication of that account that is deserving of greater attention, which is that becoming more skillful requires learning from one ’s failures, but that turns out to be especially challenging when dealing with moral failures. In skill acquisition, skills are improved by deliberate practice, where you strive to correct past mistakes and learn how to overcome your current limitations. A similar story applies to virtue acquisiti on, as moral failures will be a part of anyone’s life, an...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - March 20, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Objects or Others? Epistemic Agency and the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice
AbstractThis paper re-examines the debate between those who, with Miranda Fricker, diagnose the primary, non-contingent harm of testimonial injustice as a kind of epistemic objectification and those who contend it is better thought of as a kind of epistemic othering. Defenders of the othering account of the primary harm have often argued for it by presenting cases of testimonial injustice in which the testifier ’s epistemic agency is affirmed rather than denied, even while their credibility is unjustly impugned. In previous work, I have instead argued that such cases suggest that we need to enrich our conception of e...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - March 14, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Editorial
(Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - March 14, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Moral Deference, Moral Assertion, and Pragmatics
AbstractIn this paper, I offer a novel defense of moderate pessimism about moral deference, i.e., the view that we have pro tanto reason to avoid moral deference. I argue that moral deference fails to give us the epistemic credentials to satisfy plausible norms of moral assertion. I then argue that moral assertions made solely on the basis of deferential moral beliefs violate a plausible epistemic and moral norm against withholding information that one knows, has evidence, or ought to believe will importantly affect another person ’s deliberation. Finally, I argue that not only does moral deference fail to put the au...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - March 12, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Generic Moral Grounding
AbstractMoral theories often issue general principles that explain our moral judgments in terms of underlying moral considerations. But it is unclear whether the general principles have an explanatory role beyond the underlying moral considerations. In order to avoid the redundancy of their principles, two-level theories issue principles that appear to generalize beyond the considerations that ground them. In doing so, the principles appear to overgeneralize. The problem is conspicuous in the case of contractualism, which proposes that moral principles are grounded in generic reasons that operate in only a subset of the ca...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - March 10, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Assessing Recent Agent-Based Accounts of Right Action (and More)
AbstractAgent-based virtue ethical theories must deal with the problem of right action: if an action is right just in case it expresses a virtuous motive, then how can an agent perform the right action but for the wrong reason, or from a vicious motive? Some recent agent-based accounts purport to answer this challenge and two other related problems. Here I assess these accounts and show them to be inadequate answers to the problem of right action (and one of the other problems for agent-basing). Overall, it is shown that the most recent and promising attempts at squaring agent-based virtue ethics with commonsense morality ...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - March 5, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Famine, Affluence, and Procreation: Peter Singer and Anti-Natalism Lite
AbstractPeter Singer has argued that the affluent have very extensive duties to the world ’s poor. His argument has some important implications for procreation, most of which have not yet been acknowledged. These implications are explicated in this paper. First, the rich should desist from procreation and instead divert to the poor those resources that would have been used to rear the children that would otherwise have been produced. Second, the poor (and possibly also the rich) should desist from procreation because doing so can prevent the very bad things that would otherwise have befallen the children they would h...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - March 5, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and “The Morality System”
AbstractThis paper explores one facet of Paul Russell ’s unique “critical compatibilist” position on moral responsibility, which concerns his rejection of R. Jay Wallace’s “narrow construal” of moral responsibility as a concept tied exclusively to the Strawsonian reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt. After explaining Rus sell’s critique of Wallace’s view, the paper considers a Wallace-inspired challenge based on the idea that questions of moral responsibility raise distinct issues of “fairness” that apply only to a narrow subset of the Strawson...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - March 3, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Mary Midgley: What is Philosophy For?
(Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - February 26, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Reply to Klocksiem on the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm
AbstractIn a recent article in this journal, I claimed that the widely held counterfactual comparative account of harm (CCA) violates two very plausible principles about harm and prudential reasons. Justin Klocksiem argues, in a reply, that CCA is in fact compatible with these principles. In this rejoinder, I shall try to show that Klocksiem ’s defense of CCA fails. (Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - February 26, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

What Is the Question to which Anti-Natalism Is the Answer?
AbstractThe ethics of biological procreation has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Yet, as I show in this paper, much of what has come to be calledprocreative ethics is conducted in a strangely abstract, impersonal mode, one which stands little chance of speaking to the practical perspectives of any prospective parent. In short, the field appears to be flirting with a strange sort of practical irrelevance, wherein its verdicts are answers to questions that no-one is asking. I go on to articulate a theory of what I callexistential grounding, a notion which explains the role that prospective children play i...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - February 24, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Lost without you: the Value of Falling out of Love
AbstractIn this paper we develop a view about the disorientation attached to the process of falling out of love and explain its prudential and moral value. We start with a brief background on theories of love and situate our argument within the views concerned with the lovers ’ identities. Namely, love changes who we are. In the context of our paper, we explain this common tenet in the philosophy of love as a change in the lovers’ self-concepts through a process of mutual shaping. This, however, is potentially dangerous for people involved in what we call ‘subsumin g relationships’, who give up too ...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - February 18, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

The Virtues of Will-Power – from a Philosophical & amp; Psychological Perspective
AbstractVirtue ethics is currently one of the most widely known ethical theories. According to it, to act morally well, one needs to perfect one ’s moral character by acquiring virtues. Among various virtues, we can distinguish the group of so-called virtues of will power to which, among others, belong self-control, decisiveness, patience, etc. As they are necessary for the effectiveness of human actions, they are also called executive vir tues. It is doubtful, however, if they deserve the proper name of virtues because they can be used either in the realization of good goals or evil ones. To serve the realization of...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - February 17, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Risk-Based Sentencing and Predictive Accuracy
AbstractThe use of risk assessment tools has come to play an increasingly important role in sentencing decisions in many jurisdictions. A key issue in the theoretical discussion of risk assessment concerns the predictive accuracy of such tools. For instance, it has been underlined that most risk assessment instruments have poor to moderate accuracy in most applications. However, the relation between, on the one hand, judgements of the predictive accuracy of a risk assessment tool and, on the other, conclusions concerning the justified use of such an instrument in sentencing practice, is often very unclear. The purpose of t...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - February 8, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

The Right to Feel Comfortable: Implicit Bias and the Moral Potential of Discomfort
AbstractAn increasingly popular view in scholarly literature and public debate on implicit biases holds that there is progressive moral potential in the discomfort that liberals and egalitarians feel when they realize they harbor implicit biases. The strong voices among suchdiscomfort advocates believe we have a moral and political duty to confront people with their biases even though we risk making them uncomfortable. Only a few voices have called attention to the aversive effects of discomfort. Suchdiscomfort skeptics warn that, because people often react negatively to feeling blamed or called-out, the result of confront...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - January 25, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Why Epistemic Reductionism Won ’t Save the Moral Error Theorist
AbstractMoral error theorists often respond to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy by adopting the Disparity Response: reject the putative parity between moral and epistemic reasons and claim that though the former are irreducibly normative, the latter aren ’t. I argue such a response fails. Expanding on Das’ Australas J Philos 95(1):58–69, (2017) work I present a master argument against Disparity Responses: the arguments moral error theorists use to advance their conceptual claim apply in the epistemic domain also. This prohibits the error theorist from adopting epistemic reductionism. I use Jonas...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - January 21, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

On the Limitations of Moral Exemplarism: Socio-Cultural Values and Gender
AbstractIn this paper, I highlight and discuss two significant limitations of Zagzebski ’s (in Exemplarist moral theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017) exemplarist moral theory. Although I focus on Zagzebski’s theory, I argue that these limitations are not unique to her approach but also feature in previous versions of moral exemplarism. The first limitation I identify is i nspired by MacIntyre’s (in After virtue, Duckworth, London, 1981) understanding of the concept of virtue and stems from the realization that the emotion of admiration, through which agents identify exemplars, should not be exam...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - January 13, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

How to (dis)solve the Gamer ’s Dilemma
AbstractThe Gamer ’s Dilemma challenges us to find a distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. Without such a distinction, we are forced to conclude that either both actions are morally acceptable or that both should be morally illicit. This paper argues that the best way to solve the dilemma is, in one sense, to dissolve it. The Gamer’s Dilemma rests on a misunderstanding in the sense that it does not distinguish between the effects that theform of a simulation can have on moral judgment apart from its surfacecontent. A greater appreciation of the way structural features of a simulat...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - January 11, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Feeling Badly Is Not Good Enough: a Reply to Fritz and Miller
AbstractKyle Fritz and Daniel Miller ’s (2019) reply to my (2018) article helpfully clarifies their position and our main points of disagreement. Their view is that those who blame hypocritically lack the right to blame for a violation of some moral normN in virtue of having an unfair disposition to blame others, but not themselves, for violations ofN. This view raises two key questions. First, are there instances of hypocritical blame that do not involve an unfair differential blaming disposition? Second, if the answer to the first question is Yes, do hypocritical blamers of this kind lack the right to blame? In thi...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - January 11, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Anti-Immigration Backlashes as Constraints
AbstractMigration often causes what I refer to in this paper as ‘anti-immigration backlashes’ in receiving countries. Such reactions have substantial costs in terms of the undermining of national solidarity and the diffusion of political distrust. In short, anti-immigration backlashes can threaten the social and political stability of receiving countries. Do such risks constitute a reason against permissive immigration policies which are otherwise desirable? I argue that a positive answer may depend on a skeptical view based on the alleged constraints that certain political facts - especially facts about human ...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - January 10, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Moral Constraints on Gender Concepts
AbstractAre words like ‘woman’ or ‘man’ sex terms that we use to talk about biological features of individuals? Are they gender terms that we use to talk about non-biological features e.g. social roles? Contextualists answer both questions affirmatively, arguing that these terms concern biological or non-biologica l features depending on context. I argue that a recent version of contextualism, floated by Jennifer Saul and defended by Esa Diaz-Leon, doesn’t exhibit the right kind of flexibility to capture our theoretical intuitions or moral and political practices concerning our uses of these w...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - January 8, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Saba Bazargan-Forward & amp; Samuel C. Rickless (eds.): The Ethics of War: Essays
AbstractThis review of the bookThe Ethics of War: Essays provides a general description of the book and some brief commentary on several of its chapters. (Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - January 3, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Managing Vice
(Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - January 3, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Out of Proportion? On Surveillance and the Proportionality Requirement
AbstractIn this article, we critically scrutinize the principle of proportionality when used in the context of security and government surveillance. We argue that McMahan ’s distinction from just warfare betweennarrow proportionality (cases in which a threatener is liable to suffer the harms inflicted upon him in the course of surveillance) andwide proportionality (involving harms inflicted on non-liable individuals) can generally apply to the context of surveillance. We argue that narrow proportionality applies more or less directly to cases in which the surveilled is liable and that the wide proportionality princip...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - January 2, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Morality and Interpretation: the Principle of Phronetic Charity
AbstractThe recent discussions on the unity of virtue (or lack thereof) suffer from a lack of reference to the processes through which we interpret each other as moral agents. In the present paper it is argued that much light can be thrown on that crucial issue by appealing to a version of Donald Davidson ’s Principle of Charity, which we call “Principle of Phronetic Charity”. The idea is that in order to treat somebody as a moral agent, one has first to attribute to them, at least pro tempore, a significant degree of practical wisdom (intended as ethical expertise) and, then, to assess and rat ionally ad...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - January 2, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Motivation and the Virtue of Honesty: Some Conceptual Requirements and Empirical Results
AbstractThe virtue of honesty has been stunningly neglected in contemporary philosophy, with only two papers appearing in the last 40  years. The first half of this paper is a conceptual exploration of one aspect of the virtue, namely the honest person’s motivational profile. I argue that egoistic motives for telling the truth or not cheating are incompatible with honest motivation. At the same time, there is no one specific mo tive that is required for a person to be motivated in a virtuously honest way. Instead I advance a pluralistic theory of honest motivation, which allows for motives of caring, fairness, a...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - January 2, 2020 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Editorial: Open Science and Ethics
(Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - December 31, 2019 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Candice Delmas: A Duty to Resist: When Disobedience Should Be Uncivil
(Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - December 26, 2019 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Russell on Naturalism and Practical Reason
AbstractThis response to Paul Russell looks at how we should understand the moral sentiments and their role in action. I think that there is an important tension in Russell ’s interpretation of this role. On the one hand, aspects of Russell’s position commit him to some kind of rationalism about the emotions: for instance, he has argued that P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive is crudely naturalistic; and he has claimed that emotions are constitutive of our sensitivity to moral reasons. On the other hand, he has explicitly endorsed a Humean view of motivation which, I will argue, is incompatible with...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - December 10, 2019 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

First-Personal Moral Testimony: a Defence
AbstractSeveral authors have discussed and defended what is sometimes called the Asymmetry Thesis in social epistemology: that while reliance on testimony is essentially incontrovertible in epistemology, it is uniquely problematic for moral knowledge. This conclusion results, I argue, from considering the wrong sort of moral testimony: namely, ‘third-personal’ rather than ‘first-personal’ testimony. First-personal moral testimony is an inescapable part of the constitution of legitimate moral norms, and its role cannot be deflated as a form of mere information to be taken up in private deliberation. ...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - December 10, 2019 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Moral Understanding, Testimony, and Moral Exemplarity
AbstractWhile possessing moral understanding is agreed to be a core epistemic and moral value, it remains a matter of dispute whether it can be acquired via testimony and whether it involves an ability to engage in moral reasoning. This paper addresses both issues with the aim of contributing to the current debates on moral understanding in moral epistemology and virtue ethics. It is argued that moral epistemologists should stop appealing to the argument from the transmissibility of moral understanding to make a case for their favorite view of moral understanding. It is also argued that proponents of exemplarist moral theo...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - December 9, 2019 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

The Nature of Punishment Revisited: Reply to Wringe
AbstractThis paper continues a debate about the following claim: an agent punishes someone only if she aims to harm him. In a series of papers, Bill Wringe argues that this claim is false, I criticize his arguments, and he replies. Here, I argue that his reply fails. (Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - December 9, 2019 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

A Life Plan Principle of Voting Rights
AbstractWho should have a right to participate in a polity ’s decision-making? Although the answers to this ‘boundary problem’ in democratic theory remain controversial, it is widely believed that the enfranchisement of tourists and children is unacceptable. Yet, the two most prominent inclusion principles in the literature – Robert Goodin’s ‘al l (possibly) affected interests’-principle and the ‘all subjected to law’-principle – both enfranchise those groups. Unsurprisingly, democratic theorists have therefore offered several reasons for nonetheless exempting tou...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - December 9, 2019 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Virtue Measurement: Theory and Applications
AbstractOur primary aim in this paper is to sketch the account of virtue that we think most amenable to virtue measurement. Our account integrates Whole Trait Theory (WTT) from psychology with a broadly neo-Aristotelian approach to virtue. Our account is ‘ecumenical’ in that it has appeal for a wide range of virtue ethicists. According to WTT, a personality trait is composed of a set of situation-specific trait-appropriate responses, which are produced when certain “social-cognitive” mechanisms (cognitive/affective/motivational processes and dispositions) are triggered by the perception of trait-rel...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - December 6, 2019 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Vices of Other Minds
(Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice)
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - December 4, 2019 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research

Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence
AbstractThis paper sketches a general account of how to respond in an epistemically rational way to moral disagreement. Roughly, the account states that when two parties, A and B, disagree as to whetherp, A saysp while B says not-p, this is higher-order evidence that A has made a cognitive error on the first-order level of reasoning in coming to believe thatp (and likewise for B with respect to not-p). If such higher-order evidence is not defeated, then one rationally ought to reduce one ’s confidence with respect to the proposition in question. We term thisthe higher-order evidence account (the HOE account), and pre...
Source: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice - November 16, 2019 Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research