Possibilities and the parallel meanings of factual and counterfactual conditionals.

Possibilities and the parallel meanings of factual and counterfactual conditionals. Mem Cognit. 2020 Jun 03;: Authors: Espino O, Byrne RMJ, Johnson-Laird PN Abstract The mental model theory postulates that the meanings of conditionals are based on possibilities. Indicative conditionals-such as "If he is injured tomorrow, then he will take some leave"-have a factual interpretation that can be paraphrased as It is possible, and remains so, that he is injured tomorrow, and in that case certain that he takes some leave. Subjunctive conditionals, such as, "If he were injured tomorrow, then he would take some leave," have a prefactual interpretation that has the same paraphrase. But when context makes clear that his injury will not occur, the subjunctive has a counterfactual paraphrase, with the first clause: It was once possible, but does not remain so, that he will be injured tomorrow. Three experiments corroborated these predictions for participants' selections of paraphrases in their native Spanish, for epistemic and deontic conditionals, for those referring to past and to future events, and for those with then clauses referring to what may or must happen. These results are contrary to normal modal logics. They are also contrary to theories based on probabilities, which are inapplicable to deontic conditionals, such as, "If you have a ticket, then you must enter the show." PMID: 32495318 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher]
Source: Memory and Cognition - Category: Neuroscience Tags: Mem Cognit Source Type: research