Well-being Monism Defended

AbstractIn “Well-Being and Pluralism” (2021), Polly Mitchell and Anna Alexandrova defend conceptual pluralism about well-being. Conceptual pluralism about well-being holds that there are multiple, irreducible concepts of well-being that are employed in different contexts, all equally legitimate as concepts of well-being. Moreover,"Conceptual pluralism about well-being entails that there is no single essence which characterises all and only instances of well-being ” (Mitchell and Alexandrova in J Happiness Stud 22:2411–2433, 2021). Conceptual monism about well-being, on the other hand, holds, at a minimum, that there is some essence that unites all legitimate uses of 'well-being'. In this paper, I will argue that there is a version of conceptual monism ab out well-being, the network theory of well-being defended by Michael Bishop in his bookThe Good Life (2015), that can secure all of the benefits of Mitchell and Alexandrova's conceptual pluralism, namely accommodating the wide range of uses of “well-being” in the sciences of well-being and in ordinary language. Mitchell and Alexandrova’s argument for pluralism depends on the inability of a monistic theory of well-being to account for this diversity of conceptions of well-being and the diversity of instruments used to measure well-be ing in the sciences. Bishop’s network theory, like Mitchell and Alexandrova’s pluralism, is designed to accommodate the scientific study of well-being. Because of this, it a...

Source: Journal of Happiness Studies - July 6, 2022 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Source Type: research