Identity-relative paternalism and allowing harm to others

Dominic Wilkinson’s defence of identity-relative paternalism raises many important issues that are well worth considering.1 In this short paper, I will argue that there could be two important differences between the first-party and third-party cases that Wilkinson discusses, namely, a difference in associative duties and how the decision relates to the decision maker’s own autonomous life. This could mean that identity-relative paternalism is impermissible in a greater number of cases than he suggests. Let us begin by examining a key part of Wilkinson’s argument. He writes that ‘even if these [third-party] decision-makers are autonomous adults, their decisions will cause harm to other people, and on that basis, should be overruled’ (Wilkinson, p3).1 We can take issue with this statement for at least two reasons. First, it is not clear that these third-party decision makers cause harm by making these decisions. Rather, we might think the...

Source: Journal of Medical Ethics - May 22, 2023 Category: Medical Ethics Authors: Birks, D. Tags: Commentary Source Type: research