A troubling foundational inconsistency: autonomy and collective agency in critical care decision-making

Abstract‘Shared’ decision-making is heralded as the gold standard of how medical decisions should be reached, yet how does one ‘share’ a decision when any attempt to do so will undermineautonomous decision-making? And what exactly is being shared? While some authors have described parallels in literature, philosophical examination of shared agency remains largely uninvestigated as an explanation in bioethics. In the following, shared decision-making will be explained as occurring when a group, generally comprised of a patient and or their family, and the medical team become a genuine intentional subject which acts as a collective agent. Collective agency can better explain how some medical decisions are reached, contrary to  the traditional understanding and operationalization of ‘autonomy’ in bioethics. Paradoxically, this often occurs in the setting of high-stakes moral decision-making, where conventional wisdom would suggest individuals wouldmost want to exercise autonomous action according to their personally held values and beliefs. This explication of shared decision-making suggests a social ontology ought to inform or displace significant aspects of autonomy as construed in bioethics. It will be argued that joint commitments are a fundamental part of human life, informing and explaining much human behavior, and thus suggesting that  autonomy - conceived of as discrete, individuated moral reasoning of a singular moral agent - is not an unalloyed ‘good....
Source: Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - Category: Medical Ethics Source Type: research